This summary paper of mine is consisting topics about the objections to the aim of phenomenological reduction and phenomenology’s moving beyond the realm of the absolute given. On the preliminary discussion of some objections to the aim of the phenomenological reduction, it is where the objection concerning solipsism is discussed. According to what I read, phenomenological research is a solipsistic research. It is because through phenomenologizing, the ego disengages everything that exist excepting only himself, his states and acts. It is “solus ipse” or “I alone exist.” For short, phenomenology leads us to solipsism, making the ego’s self as the center of everything. In contrast, according to Husserl, as a phenomenologist, “I disengage everything in the world including myself, my states and acts.” One’s states and acts are precisely nature. One becomes solipsistic when he/she is ignorant of the principles in phenomenological reduction. Husserl said that in order for us not to be led to solipsism, one must disengage his/her self too. Husserl also said that the problem with what he suggested was that disengaging one’s own I is something unthinkable. Also, in phenomenological reduction, there is an absence of motivation. Phenomenologists have motives and it is personal and something private but phenomenology has no such motives to why it disengages the positing of experience.
After encountering the objections to the aim of phenomenological reduction, we are going to discuss about phenomenology’s move beyond the realm of the absolute given. Phenomenological Reduction has a tendency to lead us to solipsism. It can also lead us to absolute givenness or what we call phenomenological viewing i.e. phenomenological perception. Givenness may refer to “something revealed”, “being there”, or “there already.” If we talk about its manner, it can be apodictic, partial or absolute. If about its givenness, it is absolutely given. Whatever is phenomenologically perceived is absolute given. In the process of perception, disengagement of the perceived realm of things happens. It has duration. What is in the past is no longer given. Time flows. What is given is in the now. As time continues to flow, the now a while ago becomes just-past and it is replaced by the new now. This is always the movement in time. Whatever is in the now becomes past. In phenomenological perception, disengagement is meaningless. We can relate this in the theory of intentionality. Noesis refers to the subject which is composed of ego-cogito-cogitationes. On the other hand, Noema refers to the object which is composed of cogitationes-cogitatum. What is so common between the two is that both of them have cogitationes. It is absolutely given. That is why disengagement during this stage is just meaningless.
Retention is also important in the process of phenomenological perception. It is keeping or holding something or the act of retaining. Retention is very much related with “transcendence.” What is the difference between transcendence and “transcendence”? Transcendence without quotation mark refers to the other, the object. On the other hand, “transcendence” means the same that is other. For example, at this moment in the now I am looking at my notebook. What is in the now becomes just-past. The now a while ago is replaced by the new now. In every split of second, the notebook I am looking changes but it is still the same notebook. Each now of retention is retention of not-now because it has been a while ago. This is what we mean of “transcendence.”
If we speak of retention, we mean of course the act of retaining. It is also related to recollection. Recollection is remembering of something. It is going back to one’s experience through visualizing in the mind what had happened in the past. It is also an act of retaining. Through it, experiences, events, and feelings are being hold on. If we recollect, it is like going back to our past. I mean of going back is it’s just recalling what had happened in the past. Recollection is related to time. Time is connected to the I. The question now is where is the I? Of course I is in the present and always in the present. The I is capable of recollection. The nearer experiences (feelings and events) we recollect, the more absolute and sure we are in our recollection. While in the case of farther experiences (feelings and events) we recollect, the less absolute and less sure we are in our recollection (except in the case of memorable experiences.) If our recollection is less absolute, the more prone we are in deception. I want to compare the scientist and the phenomenologist in relation to recollection. If the scientists would like to recollect, they just go back to the very moment where they wanted to go back. In the case of the phenomenologist, they go back to the past as if they go back (rewinding) from present to past never missing any single details. They do it almost of their time and it becomes bigger and bigger. They can savor more the past accepting those experiences as the reason of what is in the present.
After discussing about the recollection, now we will go to the possibility of the phenomenological but not absolute appropriation of the entire region of the empirical on expectation. If recollection as we all know is considered something in the past, expectation is something in the future. Expectation refers to something anticipated in the future. It is just a mental imagination of what the I thinks to happen in the future. It may be phenomenological but it can never be absolute. Anything in the future in the context of philosophy is never absolute. There is no 100% sureness in our expectation. I want to compare the scientist and phenomenologist in relation to expectation. If the scientists would expect something and the expectation is unfulfilled, it’s just okay to them. They can try and try until they get it (trial and error). In the case of the phenomenologist, if they expect something, they want it to be fulfilled. Even though it’s not absolute, they wanted it to be near to the truth.
After seeing the absoluteness we can see in recollection (past) and expectation (future), we will go now to “transcendence in immanence.” Transcendence and immanence are two different things. If we speak of transcendence, we mean of course the other or the object while immanence would mean to internal, sameness or the subject. Going back to “transcendence in immanence”, it means the other/object in the subject. The ego experiences himself as the “Leib” while his experience to the other is “korper.” Same also in the views of all other egos. I believed to what Husserl wrote: “the sense of the other is in me but the other is the other and not me.” With that, the experience of oneself happens and feeling others feeling also happens. What I mean is that all of us egos are both subject for ourselves and objects for the others. I want to compare the scientist and the phenomenologist in relation to empathy, experience of oneself and “transcendence in immanence.” If the scientists would use other people in their experiments, they treat them as objects (without immanence.) On the other hand, if the phenomenologist would like to use other people in their experiments, they are aware of the “subjectness” and “objectness” of the other. That’s empathy!
After discussing about the absolute givenness, retention, recollection, expectation, immanence, transcendence, etc, we at least have an idea why Husserl spent most of his life in studying phenomenology and wanted to finish and perfect it while he is living. It is because he wanted to make it a science (body of knowledge, field, and study). His goal actually is to go beyond the realm of absolute givenness as a necessary condition for the possibility of a phenomenological science. He never finished it for the rest of his life but it is worth spending for. If we say absolute givenness, we of course mean the present. Time is always connected with the I and the I is in the present. Science is going beyond the present. It is not science if it does not. Going beyond the present may mean going to the past or to the future. It happens through recollection and expectation. With this, phenomenology becomes phenomenological science for it goes beyond the present, where the I is actually there.
After encountering the objections to the aim of phenomenological reduction, we are going to discuss about phenomenology’s move beyond the realm of the absolute given. Phenomenological Reduction has a tendency to lead us to solipsism. It can also lead us to absolute givenness or what we call phenomenological viewing i.e. phenomenological perception. Givenness may refer to “something revealed”, “being there”, or “there already.” If we talk about its manner, it can be apodictic, partial or absolute. If about its givenness, it is absolutely given. Whatever is phenomenologically perceived is absolute given. In the process of perception, disengagement of the perceived realm of things happens. It has duration. What is in the past is no longer given. Time flows. What is given is in the now. As time continues to flow, the now a while ago becomes just-past and it is replaced by the new now. This is always the movement in time. Whatever is in the now becomes past. In phenomenological perception, disengagement is meaningless. We can relate this in the theory of intentionality. Noesis refers to the subject which is composed of ego-cogito-cogitationes. On the other hand, Noema refers to the object which is composed of cogitationes-cogitatum. What is so common between the two is that both of them have cogitationes. It is absolutely given. That is why disengagement during this stage is just meaningless.
Retention is also important in the process of phenomenological perception. It is keeping or holding something or the act of retaining. Retention is very much related with “transcendence.” What is the difference between transcendence and “transcendence”? Transcendence without quotation mark refers to the other, the object. On the other hand, “transcendence” means the same that is other. For example, at this moment in the now I am looking at my notebook. What is in the now becomes just-past. The now a while ago is replaced by the new now. In every split of second, the notebook I am looking changes but it is still the same notebook. Each now of retention is retention of not-now because it has been a while ago. This is what we mean of “transcendence.”
If we speak of retention, we mean of course the act of retaining. It is also related to recollection. Recollection is remembering of something. It is going back to one’s experience through visualizing in the mind what had happened in the past. It is also an act of retaining. Through it, experiences, events, and feelings are being hold on. If we recollect, it is like going back to our past. I mean of going back is it’s just recalling what had happened in the past. Recollection is related to time. Time is connected to the I. The question now is where is the I? Of course I is in the present and always in the present. The I is capable of recollection. The nearer experiences (feelings and events) we recollect, the more absolute and sure we are in our recollection. While in the case of farther experiences (feelings and events) we recollect, the less absolute and less sure we are in our recollection (except in the case of memorable experiences.) If our recollection is less absolute, the more prone we are in deception. I want to compare the scientist and the phenomenologist in relation to recollection. If the scientists would like to recollect, they just go back to the very moment where they wanted to go back. In the case of the phenomenologist, they go back to the past as if they go back (rewinding) from present to past never missing any single details. They do it almost of their time and it becomes bigger and bigger. They can savor more the past accepting those experiences as the reason of what is in the present.
After discussing about the recollection, now we will go to the possibility of the phenomenological but not absolute appropriation of the entire region of the empirical on expectation. If recollection as we all know is considered something in the past, expectation is something in the future. Expectation refers to something anticipated in the future. It is just a mental imagination of what the I thinks to happen in the future. It may be phenomenological but it can never be absolute. Anything in the future in the context of philosophy is never absolute. There is no 100% sureness in our expectation. I want to compare the scientist and phenomenologist in relation to expectation. If the scientists would expect something and the expectation is unfulfilled, it’s just okay to them. They can try and try until they get it (trial and error). In the case of the phenomenologist, if they expect something, they want it to be fulfilled. Even though it’s not absolute, they wanted it to be near to the truth.
After seeing the absoluteness we can see in recollection (past) and expectation (future), we will go now to “transcendence in immanence.” Transcendence and immanence are two different things. If we speak of transcendence, we mean of course the other or the object while immanence would mean to internal, sameness or the subject. Going back to “transcendence in immanence”, it means the other/object in the subject. The ego experiences himself as the “Leib” while his experience to the other is “korper.” Same also in the views of all other egos. I believed to what Husserl wrote: “the sense of the other is in me but the other is the other and not me.” With that, the experience of oneself happens and feeling others feeling also happens. What I mean is that all of us egos are both subject for ourselves and objects for the others. I want to compare the scientist and the phenomenologist in relation to empathy, experience of oneself and “transcendence in immanence.” If the scientists would use other people in their experiments, they treat them as objects (without immanence.) On the other hand, if the phenomenologist would like to use other people in their experiments, they are aware of the “subjectness” and “objectness” of the other. That’s empathy!
After discussing about the absolute givenness, retention, recollection, expectation, immanence, transcendence, etc, we at least have an idea why Husserl spent most of his life in studying phenomenology and wanted to finish and perfect it while he is living. It is because he wanted to make it a science (body of knowledge, field, and study). His goal actually is to go beyond the realm of absolute givenness as a necessary condition for the possibility of a phenomenological science. He never finished it for the rest of his life but it is worth spending for. If we say absolute givenness, we of course mean the present. Time is always connected with the I and the I is in the present. Science is going beyond the present. It is not science if it does not. Going beyond the present may mean going to the past or to the future. It happens through recollection and expectation. With this, phenomenology becomes phenomenological science for it goes beyond the present, where the I is actually there.